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 The purpose of this study is to examine factors that affect the longevity of individual 
terrorists. Previous studies on terrorist group longevity have focused on the decisions terrorist 
groups have made rather than focusing on factors that help individuals evade capture. Literature 
also suggests that terrorists that manage to stay active may be able to use this as a valuable 
recruiting tool. This project examines six different relationships with longevity, including 
Attorney General (AG) Guidelines, demographics, ideology, level of participation, number of 
activities, and sophistication of attack. To examine these relationships, data will be used from the 
American Terrorism Study (ATS) to conduct bivariate analysis. The results support most of the 
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 Law enforcement has a strong influence on how long terrorist organizations last (Freilich, 
Chermak, and Caspi, 2009). While they can combat terrorism, it is often not fully reflected in 
their training. When law enforcement trains on how to handle terrorism, they primarily focus on 
what they did “right,” and on their successes. In previous counterterrorism investigations, 
learning from past successes and failures of investigators is a significant segment of training, but 
they rarely discuss what terrorists are doing right to avoid capture. It is necessary to view this 
concept through the lens of successful terrorists to further understand how future plots can be 
thwarted (Smith, 2015).  
It appears that the longer individuals can avoid arrest after they commit an incident, the 
more appeal participation will have to others when it comes to recruiting individuals who share 
their views and are bordering on violent radicalization. If being able to commit attacks and avoid 
capture can influence recruitment and radicalization, it becomes imperative that law enforcement 
gain a better understanding of this facet of longevity. Doing so will help solve and prevent future 
cases of terrorism (Jones and Libicki, 2008). Smith (2015; pg 2) stated that for this to happen, we 
need to focus on “factors that are associated with the survivability and sustainability of 
individual terrorists and, if affiliated, the manner in which they interact with their associates.” 
This project will aim to examine why it is important to study individual terrorists and then 
analyze factors that may lead to their demise.   
Although, while training from the point of view of a successful terrorist may be ideal, it 
may not be a viable option due to the lack of data and research focusing on this topic. Given the 
possible relationship between longevity and its impact on recruitment and radicalization, the 
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phenomenon deserves to be studied. Although researchers have considered the sustainability and 
strategies of terrorist groups (Crenshaw, 1988; Rapoport, 1992; Hoffman, 1998; Frelich, 
Chermak and Caspi, 2009), they have not examined the factors that may be used by individuals 
to evade capture. This research is relevant to the field and lays the groundwork for being able to 
study individuals, giving a better understanding of how terrorists behave and how they can be 
stopped.  
This thesis is a part of a larger project funded by the National Institute of Justice. The 
proposal of this project evolved from two previous projects that examined identity and framing 
theory1  and examining patterns in the activities that terrorists engaged in before their planned 
incident.2 Identity and framing theory find that individuals aim to emulate those who are 
successful. This finding would suggest that being successful in able to avoid capture may lead to 
an increase in individuals becoming radicalized. The sequencing project found that there are 
patterns in how terrorists behave before a planned incident. This result suggests that there may be 
a relationship between certain preparatory activities that took place before the planned incident 
and how long a terrorist will last. This thesis will examine individuals who have been charged 
with terrorism-related statutes in the United States from 1980 to 2018. The goal of the study is to 
analyze individuals’ behaviors in an attempt to identify factors that may help sustain terrorists’ 
careers. If terrorists’ careers are shortened, the probability that individuals will be susceptible to 
radicalization may decrease. 
 
  
                                                      
1 Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization Process, NIJ Grant 
#2012-ZA-BX-0003 





 Previous research has examined the sustainability of terrorist groups and extremist 
movements, but they have not yet examined individual terrorists. Smith (2015) refers to two 
main reasons that this examination is necessary. First, there is substantial research suggesting 
that law enforcement involvement has a considerable impact on terrorist movements (Smith and 
Damphousse, 2009; Hamm, 1993, 2007; Smith, 1994). Jones and Libicki (2008) studied over 
250 terrorist organizations and concluded that law enforcement was responsible for 
approximately 40% of groups demise when they arrested or killed their leaders. However, if law 
enforcement overreacts, they may receive backlash (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009). 
Despite these varying outcomes, it is evident that law enforcement may be one of the most 
critical factors influencing group success or demise.  
 The second reason to study longevity of individuals, discussed by Smith (2015), is the 
shift in terroristic strategies over the past couple of decades. Strategies such as the leaderless 
resistance, were developed to avoid arrest and prosecution (Smith, 2000). Among the extreme 
right, “leaderless resistance” emerged, Islamic extremists employed the use of the “fatwah,” and 
environmental groups used the internet to communicate with individuals indirectly. These 
strategies demonstrate the widespread shift to uncoordinated violence models in the mid-1990s 
(Spaaij, 2010; Pantucci, 2011; Borum, Fein, and Vossekuil, 2012; Gill, Horgan and Deckert, 
2014). As a result of the uncoordinated violence model, there was an increase of lone actors 
which has raised concerns for law enforcement (Michael, 2012). Among those concerned include 
the Department of Homeland Security, which stated in one of its briefs that “lone wolves and 
small cells… are the most dangerous threat to the national security of the United States” (DHS, 
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2009; pg 7). As lone wolves become more common, it is important to study individual and group 
sustainability tactics. Similarly, because it appears terrorists have learned that they can avoid 
arrest by restricting contact with group members, one must include uncoordinated violence 
strategies when analyzing longevity.  
 This thesis will examine six factors that may be related to longevity. These include 
demographic characteristics of the individual terrorists, their ideological beliefs, the extent of 
participatory involvement with other terrorists, the number of preparatory activities they were 
involved in per incident, the sophistication of the incident(s) in which the individuals were 
involved, and the impact that changes in the Attorney General Guidelines for Terrorism 
Investigations might have had on the ability of individual terrorists to evade capture. The 
following sections discuss these factors in greater detail.  
Demographics 
It is possible that demographic characteristics may play a role in an individual terrorist’s 
ability to avoid detection. Demographics such as age differences, gender, and different levels of 
educational attainment may have significant impacts on longevity. Prior research shows that 
there are measurable differences in the demographic characteristics of individuals belonging to 
different ideologies and that there are numerous factors that influence an individual’s decision to 
join specific movements. Smith and Damphousse (1997), were able to identify critical 
demographic trends such as the average age of any indicted terrorist in the United States is 35-
40. This is considerably older than the average age of persons charged in federal court. However, 
the average age of a member of the Islamic extremist movement is in the late 20s, which is still 




While the age of a terrorist may vary, the gender of a terrorist is much more predictable. 
Terrorism is a male-dominated career, especially with far-right and Islamic extremists, who are 
overwhelmingly male (Smith and Morgan, 1994). Environmental and far-left extremists have 
more female members and more females in leadership roles. The increase in women in these 
groups are likely due to the nature of their beliefs; these groups are more egalitarian which gives 
females the opportunity to have higher levels of participation. Far-left and environmental 
extremists are typically more highly educated – many were radicalized during their post-
secondary education – while far-right and Islamic extremists tend to have lower levels of 
education (Corley, Smith, and Damphousse, 2005). This thesis will demonstrate that 
demographic differences may be causally related to the longevity of individual terrorists. 
Terrorism Group Structure 
 As mentioned previously, the structure and tactics of terrorism are pursuant to the goal of 
longevity. The three major models are rural revolutionary; cellular; and unorganized. These 
models formed as a response to the failure of the model that came before it. As terrorist 
organizations evolve, they have become less formally structured and more fragmented.  
 The rural revolutionary model successfully aided Fidel Castro in his overtaking of Cuba: 
his strategy was to gain control of the countryside to take over urban areas. Using guerilla tactics, 
Castro formed a military with a hierarchal structure to implement his takeover. Subsequently, the 
fall of Havana in 1959 solidified the success of the revolution. The rural revolutionary model 
began to break down in 1967 when Castro’s ally, Che Guevera, attempted to use it in Bolivia. 
Guevera and his men, however, were captured and killed, ending his attempt at a revolution. This 
failure led to a significant shift in terrorist tactics (Smith, 2000).  
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Before Guevara was killed, Carlos Marighella wrote The Minimanual of the Urban 
Guerilla, which was a guideline for guerrilla warfare. It became a staple in far-left literature, 
advocating attacking capitalism and urban centers, leading to the urban cellular model (Smith 
and Morgan, 1994). This model organized extremists into cells, so the leader of the group was 
unknown to the fighters. Marighella’s Minimanual influenced terrorist cells to move to cities, the 
heart of capitalism, to attack it from within. The Minimanual also influenced groups during the 
1970s and 1980s to target symbols of capitalism such as banks and armories (Smith, 2000).  
 The government enacted guidelines to crack down on terrorism during the 1970s, 
ultimately resulting in the indictments of approximately 200 terrorists from all ideologies. 
Notable leaders from the far-right, Richard Butler, Robert Miles, and Louis Beam, were all 
acquitted of charges linked to their involvement in the “War in ’84.” This failure to convict led 
the far-right movement to call for leaderless resistance. Leaderless resistance represents merely 
one of several tactics referred to as “uncoordinated violence.” The new structure was intended to 
distance leaders from crimes to limit their liability with extremist groups. With individuals acting 
on their own, the leaders hoped to avoid further conspiracy charges. Uncoordinated violence and 
fatwas call for violent action against certain entities in which individuals will take these orders 
and use them as inspiration to carry out plots of their own (Smith, 2000).    
Ideology 
 Ideology can be encompassing of many different characteristics that may be beneficial to 
longevity, such as the types of incidents committed or the type of person drawn to the cause. 
While demographic differences can have an effect, unique characteristics may contribute to 
differences in longevity. Successful groups and individuals often take advantage of sustainability 
tactics that contribute to survival. Over time, different types of ideological movements have held 
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their place in the spotlight because movements can be reflective of the political climate of their 
time. Crenshaw (1991) stated that they are likely to meet their demise when the public is no 
longer supportive of their cause, or their purpose has been mitigated. The sections that follow 
will discuss ideologies, and how their unique tactics may relate to an individual’s longevity.  
Far-Left Extremism 
 In the past, individuals that subscribed to far-left ideologies tended to be Marxist. 
Typically, their goals were to overthrow the existing government in favor of the formation of a 
new system, whether it be socialism, communism, anarchy. They are typically “forward-
looking” – desiring society to morph into a system that the U.S. has previously never had. Far-
left terrorists in the U.S. evolved out of the anti-war and civil rights movements of the 1960s. 
Many of these individuals were involved in the student revolution of the 1960s, or they were 
involved in prison reform and unionization. Individuals involved with the far-left tended to be 
higher educated and more diverse in gender and race (Smith and Morgan, 1994).  
Far-left terrorist groups began committing severe attacks against the United States 
government in the 1960s and 1970s (Smith, 1994). They typically utilized the cellular model, but 
they sometimes worked together. For example, Marilyn Buck, of the May 19th Communist 
Organization (M19CO), would work with other groups such as the Black Liberation Army 
(BLA) to commit attacks and make it more difficult for law enforcement to decipher who 
committed such attacks. While this may have benefitted them in some situations, the affiliations 
also left them more exposed to law enforcement. Left-wing terrorism began to wane at the end of 
the Cold War as communism fell out of favor. Along with M19CO and the BLA, other 
significant far-left groups include the United Freedom Front (UFF), the Symbionese Liberation 
Army (SLA) and the Weather Underground (WU) (Smith and Morgan, 1994).  
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 The UFF was the most successful far-left terrorist group in the 1970s and 1980s. They 
were opposed to the U.S. military’s intervention in, and foreign policy toward, Central America. 
They were a viable group for nine years, from 1975 to 1984. During that time, they managed to 
commit at least nine bank robberies and 20 bombings, although they are suspected of having 
committed additional attacks. The members of the UFF never recruited outside of their core eight 
members, which included racially and gender diverse individuals with prison backgrounds. They 
managed to avoid arrest by maintaining the appearance of typical nuclear families. The group 
had three couples, two of which eventually had three children each. To communicate with each 
other, they used public telephones and mail drops, so they could not be tracked (Smith, 1994).  
Far-Right Extremism 
 Far-right terrorists have numerous issues that they may feel compelled to fight for, such 
as gun rights, anti-abortion, freedom of religion, anti-tax, anti-minority, etc. The desire to 
maintain traditional views typically motivates their ideology, and for society to regress to 
opinions on civil rights and liberties more prominent in America’s history. Members of the far-
right tend to be white males with less than a college education, although many right-wing group 
leaders were highly educated. Far-right terrorism gained much of its momentum in the 1980s and 
1990s, primarily as a backlash to the progress made by more liberal groups in the United States 
during the same period. Notable far-right groups of this time include the Order; Covenant, 
Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSA); and the Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994).  
 In 1992, after the attempted prosecution of three prominent far-right leaders, Louis Beam 
wrote an essay calling for a “leaderless resistance” strategy for members of the extreme far-right. 
Shields (2008) found that this new approach had a significant effect on terrorists’ trials, such as 
the average number of perpetrators per case, and how of those many turned state’s evidence. 
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This strategy evolved from the failed use of rural compounds by the far-right and other terrorist 
organizations.  
The leaderless resistance strategy calls for “lone actors,” which gives individuals no 
directions, no knowledge of anyone else in the movement, and it requires that they know that 
they would take full blame for any attacks if caught. Lone actor strategies require that members 
be self-taught in all they need to know. It is assumed that members of the cell will have the same 
mindset, and they will likely react to certain situations with similar levels of disgust. They are 
thus allowed to trust in their disgust and anger to guide them in selecting suitable targets. This 
strategy protects others with similar beliefs, allowing the movement to live long past the arrest or 
death of any individual perpetrator (Beam, 1992).  
A prime example of the leaderless resistance approach is Eric Rudolph, who bombed 
Olympic Park in Atlanta, GA in 1996, and committed other anti-gay and anti-abortion attacks. 
Once police discovered that he had committed the bombings, Rudolph went into hiding, which 
lead to a five-year manhunt. He used survival skills to live in the woods. According to those who 
were present, he seemed relieved and tired of running when he was finally caught (Vollers, 
2007).  
Islamic Extremism 
 The Islamic extremist movement has a deep history abroad, and it is typically anti-
western and anti-imperialism in nature. It operates under jihadism; this terminology became 
widespread after the 9/11 attacks. Members of the movement did not start attacking American 
entities until the 1980s, and even then, the targets were located abroad. Targets included U.S. 
embassies, U.S. flights, and locations where the U.S. military spent time, such as clubs. These 
individuals are typically less educated than other types of terrorists, as stated earlier. After 9/11, 
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Islamic extremism tends to be the ideology that the public most associates with the concept of 
“terrorism.”  
 Due to the relative newness of Islamic terrorism in the United States, the number of 
jihadists who have evaded capture for an extended period is relatively small. Their plots range 
from somewhat complicated, for example, the 9/11 attacks, to unsophisticated events that require 
minimal training or preparation, for example, the Manhattan bike path attack. Although they 
have taken advantage of the internet for recruitment (Bargh & McKenna, 2004), there has yet to 
be a radicalized domestic individual who has had substantial longevity.  
Environmental Extremism 
 Environmental terrorism is unique compared to other types of terrorism due to its motives 
and methods, but its adherents’ views may overlap with different ideologies as well. Their core 
motivation is to protect the planet and animals; they do not believe that any living thing should 
be killed or used in scientific testing. They often oppose urban sprawl because of its impact on 
nature. As a result of their beliefs, they tend to commit their attacks at night to ensure that they 
do not harm any humans or living creatures. They often target establishments such as logging 
companies or universities that test on animals (Schwartz, 1998).  
 The first recognized environmental group was the Eco-Raiders, who were against urban 
sprawl and committed attacks against newly established housing complexes in Arizona in 1971. 
They destroyed and vandalized houses, which led to millions of dollars in damages (Arnold, 
1997). Other environmental groups include Earth First, Animal Liberation Front (ALF), 
Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) and The Family. ELF had a unique structure; there was 
no formal membership, and anyone who committed attacks in their name was considered an 
“Elf.” ELF was part of the movement towards an uncoordinated violence model (Liddick, 2006).  
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 An example of overlapping views in the environmental movement is Ted Kaczynski, the 
Unabomber. In addition to wanting to protect the environment, he also had far-left views. 
Kaczynski managed to commit attacks for 18 years before the FBI captured him (Freeman, 
2014). During this time, he mailed 16 bombs that killed three individuals and injured 23, 
requiring the FBI to engage in the most expensive manhunt in U.S. history. He was against the 
use of technology, viewing it as being against nature and the human psyche (Arnold, 1997). 
Kaczynski was an isolationist and lived a self-sustained lifestyle in the woods. He took numerous 
precautions to throw law enforcement off his trail, such as claiming that he was a group and 
making sure that none of his victims had connections to each other (Freeman, 2014). His writing 
style in his manifesto ultimately led to his brother recognizing him and having him arrested 
(Simpson, 2016).  
Levels of Participatory Involvement 
 An analysis for the annual START Center meeting developed this concept (Smith et al., 
2015). Researchers examined 476 indictees who were linked to 264 planned incidents from 1980 
to 2018, building on the work of Pantucci (2011), Borum et al. (2012), and Gruenewald et al. 
(2013). Smith et al. examined the pattern of indictee involvement by creating a participatory 
typology. The typology (see Table 1) is based on three elements: 1) is the person affiliated with a 
group or movement; 2) did the individual have help committing any preparatory behaviors; and 
3) did the person have help committing the planned or completed incident. Although this may be 
an oversimplified way to measure involvement, it forms categories that can be operationalized 






The complexity of a planned or completed attack may influence many of the factors 
analyzed. The level of participation, and the average number of preparatory acts, the individuals 
engage in per incident may impact their longevity. A project done by Smith (2016) examined the 
sequence of terroristic behaviors. The sequencing project used these variables as a predictor of 
failure or success of an incident, while this study will use the variables to examine the effect on 
longevity.  
U.S. Attorney General Guidelines 
 The U.S. Attorney General (AG) Guidelines provide the FBI with direction on how to 
conduct investigations. Since 1976, there have been four significant changes in the AG 
Guidelines that have influenced how terrorism investigations are handled. Many of these changes 
reflect substantial events that took place, the most notable being the legislation put in place after 
9/11. As stated previously, law enforcement intervention is one of the top reasons for a terrorist’s 
demise. Therefore, these guidelines will influence terrorists’ successes and failures.  
During the late 1970s, a restrictive set of AG Guidelines hindered the FBI. The Watergate 
scandal and the FBI’s involvement in COINTEL were examples of the FBI engaging in “political 
policing.” The FBI abused its power, which led to the creation of the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) and the implementation of the Edward Levi Guidelines in 1976. These guidelines 
were intended to restore the FBI’s muddied image by returning them to a place of “political 
neutrality.” Due to the new restrictions on law enforcement, many terrorist investigations were 
discontinued, allowing groups that had survived up to that point to continue relatively free of 
investigation (Smith, Karlson, Damphousse, 2001).  
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The Levi Guidelines were in effect from 1976 to 1982. In the early 1980s, concern 
emerged about terrorist groups from Libya and domestic far-left groups. As a result, the William 
French Smith Guidelines were implemented. Within two years, the FBI initiated a series of 
counterterrorism programs and task forces to fight terrorism around the country. During that 
period there were numerous arrests of prolific far-left leaders, as well as many far-right 
extremists who had emerged in the mid-1980s. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center 
temporarily shifted the FBI’s focus to Islamic extremism and provided a hint of things to come. 
It was not long before the FBI had to alter its attention back to domestic terrorism after two 
significant events fueled the far-right movement.  
The first catalyst was the killing of the wife and son of Randy Weaver, an anti-tax 
advocate, during a standoff that ensued at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Following the incident, Louis 
Beam held a meeting in Estes Park, Colorado, where he called for a “leaderless resistance” 
model (Kaplan, 1997). The second catalyst took place in April of 1993, when ATF agents used 
extreme tactics to force David Koresh to surrender at his Branch Davidian compound in Waco, 
Texas. The compound caught on fire and over 80 people, including children, died. Both these 
events rallied the far-right over the separation of church and state, and gun rights (Edwards, 
2001). These events were the impetus for McVeigh’s bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City. Consequently, the late 1990s witnessed a significant increase in terrorism 
investigations (Smith, Karlson, and Damphousse, 2001).  
The William French Smith Guidelines lasted for nearly 23 years, until the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. In response, Attorney General John Ashcroft altered the AG Guidelines in 
2002. The Ashcroft Guidelines loosened restrictions on investigations by giving the FBI more 
tools. The Department of Justice made prevention a priority by providing tools to aid 
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communication, thus shifting the role of the FBI from an investigative agency to an intelligence 
agency. The Ashcroft Guidelines created fusion centers as a way to streamline intelligence across 
agencies (Ashcroft, 2002).  
In 2008, the Mukasey Guidelines were implemented, further lessening restrictions and 
giving the FBI even more investigative power. Mukasey said these changes were necessary if the 
FBI wanted to become an intelligence-gathering agency in addition to a crime-solving agency. 
Soon after the guidelines went into effect, the number of individuals prosecuted for terrorism 
links nearly doubled. Impacts like this suggest that the less restrictive the AG Guidelines are, the 
shorter the longevity of terrorists will be due to the increased possibility of law enforcement 
intervention.  
Hypotheses 
H1. The fewer restrictions the Attorney General Guidelines impose on the FBI, the shorter the 
longevity of individual terrorists.  
H2.  Demographic characteristics have an effect on the longevity of individual terrorists.  
H3.  An individual’s ideology will have an effect on their longevity.  
H4.  The greater the level of participatory involvement, the shorter the longevity of the 
individual terrorist.  
H5. The greater the number of preparatory activities an individual participates in per incident, 
the shorter the longevity of the individual terrorist.  
H6.  The more “sophisticated” the planned or committed attack is, the shorter the longevity of 




DATA AND METHODS 
American Terrorism Study (ATS) 
This project will analyze data that includes officially designated terrorism cases by the 
FBI from 1980 to 2018, which were collected for the ATS and maintained in an Oracle database. 
Additionally, the ATS includes over 4,500 antecedent activities, of which 2,145 are preparatory 
activities for an incident. The database houses over 1,000,000 pages of court documents from 
federal criminal cases as well as media accounts of events. This database contains over 800 
variables on approximately 2,900 individuals indicted on terrorism-related charges. Of those 
indicted, 865 were considered perpetrators, meaning that they were linked to a plot. Other 
individuals who were not linked to a terrorist incident, were excluded for engaging in crimes 
such as material support of a terrorist organization. It was necessary that this sample is made up 
of individuals linked to a plot because that is how “longevity” was operationalized. To code 
longevity, the date of their preparatory activity and arrest must be coded. Court records and 
media documents determine how cases are coded and the inconsistencies of this data led to some 
cases not having enough data to provide dates for the longevity measure. Of these 865 
perpetrators, there was enough information to code longevity on 331 individuals. 
Procedures 
 This project followed the procedures set out in the NIJ grant on which the project is 
based. These procedures were applied to the variables necessary to operationalize the 
hypotheses. There were three components required to complete this study. The first involves 
identifying and coding existing variables for use in the hypotheses. The second is the collection 
of data on new terrorism cases and data collection for new variables. The final component 
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involved coding the time-stamps of preparatory events, terrorism incidents, and post-incident 
behaviors that will be used to calculate and analyze individuals’ longevity.  
Component 1. Variable Selection and Coding Strategy  
I examined the variables currently in the ATS that were used to test the hypotheses. For 
the hypotheses, the variables can be operationalized in multiple ways. The following sections 
will explain how the variables were operationalized and Table 2 will provide an example.  
The dependent variable in this project is the “longevity” of an individual terrorist. 
Although this has not been studied before, findings from prior literature on group longevity 
assisted in determining how individual longevity should be analyzed. Several studies have noted 
that the average terrorist group lasted for about one year (Rappoport, 1992; LaFree and Dugan, 
2009). This finding helped determine how to divide longevity into categories (shown in Table 3). 
The shortest category is six months, half of what the average group longevity has been estimated. 
A second category captures six months less and six months more than the average lifespan of the 
group. The third category was more than six months and less than three years, because, based on 
the distribution of longevities, it appeared that “greater than three years” was significantly 
distinct from other categories. The longest category is over three years, which is three times the 
average longevity that has been discussed in previous literature. 
Hypothesis one utilizes the longevity and AG Guidelines variable. Longevity was 
calculated by counting the number of days in between an individual’s first preparatory act and 
the date of their arrest. The ATS defines a preparatory act as an act that takes place before an 
attack, that is in furtherance of the goal of that incident, such as a meeting to discuss, purchase of 
materials, or surveillance of a target. Individuals were then placed into one of four AG 
Guidelines eras. This was decided based on the date of the individual’s first preparatory act. If an 
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individual’s first act was during the Levi Guidelines, but they were not caught until the Smith 
Guidelines, their longevity would be calculated with the Levi Guidelines.  
Hypothesis two examines demographics associated with longevity. The demographic of 
age was coded in years and then broken down into three categories. These categories were 
natural breaks in the data to have a similar number of individuals in each group. Education was 
coded into three categories: high school, college, and post-graduate. An individual did not need 
to finish college or post-graduate education, the only need to have some amount of education 
past the previous category. Lastly, gender was coded as male and female. 
Hypothesis three examines longevity’s relationship with an individual’s ideology. The 
ideology variable was divided into four of the most common ideologies in the database: far-left, 
far-right, Islamic Extremist, and environmental extremist. This excludes individuals who are 
categorized as “single-issue” and “nationalist/separatist.” Single-issue would be individuals 
whose personal ideology does not fall in line with the four major ideologies. For example, an 
individual who has a distaste for the American judicial system and attempts to kill judges to 
further their point. Nationalist/separatist would be individuals who want to take their group of 
people and create their own nation, such as Puerto Rican terrorists.  
Hypothesis four utilized the definitions illustrated in Table 1. The number of elements 
mentioned previously defines the typologies. A loner would be someone who would answer “no” 
to all three questions. An example of a loner is Ted Kaczynski, who had no help sending bombs 
and was not strictly associated with a movement. James Alex Fields, Jr. is an example of an 
affiliated loner; he had no help preparing a vehicle attack that killed one protestor, but he was 
affiliated with the far-right movement. Timothy McVeigh, who committed the Oklahoma City 
Bombing with help from Terry Nichols, is an example of a lone conspirator because he had help 
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preparing for an attack but committed the attack alone. The individuals who carried out 9/11 
were part of a group, having received assistance in preparing for and engaging in an attack 
together.  
Although the typology coding would have provided more detail to the analysis, because 
of the small number of true loners it was necessary to collapse loner and affiliated loner into a 
“loner” and collapse lone conspirator and group into a “group” category. The narrative is still 
effective because the only difference between loner and lone conspirator is an ideology 
affiliation. The main difference between the collapsed group labeled “loner” and “group” is 
whether or not the individual had help in their planned attack.  
 
Hypothesis five and six examine longevity from an incident standpoint. Hypothesis five 
examines the average number of preparatory activities an individual engages in, per incident. 
The reason for using the average number for the measure is because if the raw number of 
preparatory activities an individual had was used, it would not make sense. Individuals who 
lasted longer would automatically have more preparatory activities because they would have had 
Table 1. Participatory Typology 









































more time to engage in them. Because the average is the necessary measure, this analysis uses 
perpetrator data instead of person-level data.  
Hypothesis six examines the sophistication of the planned incident that the individual was 
engaged in. The database has 26 categories of type of weapons that the level of sophistication 
was based on. These categories were re-coded into three categories, least, moderate, and most 
sophisticated. Least sophisticated incidents use weapons that are accessible to any person, such 
as a knife attack. A moderately sophisticated incident uses weapons that are not as accessible 
such as a firearm. Lastly, a highly sophisticated incident uses a weapon that takes a special set of 
knowledge to utilize, such as a bomb.  
Table 2. Variable List 
Hyp. Variable Ind/Dep Measure Notes 
Attorney General Guidelines 
1. Date Independent Date of first preparatory 
activity. 
Date will be used to categorize 
which guidelines an individual 
began their career in. 
1. Longevity Dependent Same as in #1 above. 
 
See #1 above. 
 
Characteristics 
2. Age Independent Age at indictment in 
years 
Age at first preparatory 
behavior 
2. Education Independent Education in years Recoded to three categories 
2. Gender Independent Male/Female  
2. Longevity Dependent Ranges from date of 
individual’s first 
preparatory event to 
arrest. 
Continuous variable in 
“days”; collapsed categories 
for bivariate analysis  
3. Group Type Independent Left, Right, 
Environmental, AQAM 
 








Independent Loner, Affiliated Loner, 
Lone Conspirator, 
Cell/Group Member 
Recoded into loner and group 
4. Longevity Dependent Same as in #1 above. See #1 above. 
5. Career 
Preparation 
Independent Average number of 
preparatory activities by 
individual. 
Total preparatory activities 
divided by the number of 
incidents they are linked to. 




Dependent 7 category Likert item 
ranging from “least” to 
“most” sophisticated 
Used index developed in 
“Sequencing” Project. 
6. Longevity Dependent Same as in #1 above. See #1 above. 
Component 2. Data Collection and Variable Coding 
As of 2018, the ATS included 1,140 case studies linked to 1,425 federal terrorism cases. 
All of my hypotheses were conducted at the individual level, except hypothesis five was 
analyzed at the perpetrator level. A perpetrator is created in ATS when an individual is linked to 
an incident. This change in unit is necessary because the number of average preparatory 
activities was calculated using the number of incidents they are linked to. Data collection was 
completed on 605 terrorism incidents in the United States from 1980 to 2018. Analyses were 
limited to the 693 indicted individuals in the ATS who were linked to the planning or completion 
of a terrorist attack in the United States. Individuals who were involved in material support cases 
were not included, because they were unable to be linked to an incident. The variable longevity is 
the dependent variable in the hypotheses stated above. It measures the length of time in days 
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from the individual’s first preparatory act to the date of their arrest; this does not include acts that 
were not part of the preparatory process.  
Component 3. Sample/Case Selection for Analysis 
Although the potential sample of perpetrators would come from the entirety of the FBI 
court cases designated “terrorism and terrorism-related,” some cases were either not available or 
appropriate for this analysis. For example, defendants who were exonerated, and defendants who 
pleaded guilty almost immediately, did not have significant court documentation. Cases that 
were unresolved were excluded from the analysis, along with financial or material support cases.
Analytic Method 
 Once the variables were operationalized, the data was transformed into a flat data file in 
SPSS and analyzed using statistical tests. Analysis was conducted by examining the distribution 
of all variables. Descriptive statistics were used to examine the independent variables to detect 
outlier cases. Then, the bivariate relationships between independent and dependent variables 
were examined by finding correlations and testing for significance. These findings will provide 
tools for understanding the relationship of specific behavioral patterns and the longevity of 






 This analysis used data from the ATS, which includes information on over 1,500 
terrorism-related court cases. Approximately 2,000 persons were indicted in these federal 
criminal cases. Of those persons, 865 were linked to a terrorist incident. The eliminated persons 
were indicted on charges relating to material support, conspiracy, or other charges, indicating 
that they were supporting terrorism but had not yet committed an attack. Out of the 865 persons 
who were linked to an incident, 331 had enough information coded to determine their longevity. 
The person had to have a first preparatory date and a neutralizing arrest date coded to identify 
how many days they “survived.”  
Table 3: Longevity Descriptive Statistics 




Short 103 0-6 months 
Medium 83 7-18 months 
Long 61 18-36 months 
Very Long 84 36+ months 
Mean  28.39 months 
Median  14.13 months 
 
 
 According to Table 3, the average “lifespan” for an individual terrorist is approximately 
two years. Many factors may contribute to an individual’s longevity, whether it is an internal or 
external characteristic of the environment in which they are operating. The following sections 
analyze different variables that appear to be related to an individual’s ability to survive longer 




Results I: Analysis of Attorney General Guidelines 
 As mentioned previously, research has shown that law enforcement has a significant 
impact on a terrorist’s success or failure. Based on this notion, it is worth analyzing how policing 
tactics have had an effect on terrorists over time. When looking at terrorism investigations, there 
have been four significant shifts in how these investigations are conducted. The Attorney 
General Guidelines determine these investigative procedures (Ashcroft, 2002). The guidelines 
can significantly impact law enforcement’s ability to investigate terrorists’ and impact terrorists’ 
ability to avoid arrest or capture. This analysis examined longevity’s relationship to the Levi, 
Smith, Ashcroft, and Mukasey Guidelines.  
 The Levi Guidelines were enacted in 1976 as a result of a political overstep by the FBI 
during Watergate and the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTEL). At that time, the majority 
of terrorists arrested identified with a far-left ideology, while none were affiliated with an 
environmental or Islamic extremist ideology as shown in Table 4. The period was the peak of the 
far-left and beginning of the far-right. Environmental and Islamic extremist ideologies had yet to 
make it to the U.S. at that point. Terrorists during that period tended to be well educated. 
Additionally, gender was the most diverse out of any guideline period, with approximately 17% 
of perpetrators being female. All individuals captured were part of a group, because the cellular 
model was the dominant choice of organization for terrorist groups. Additionally, the data only 
contains individuals in groups, because the FBI did not recognize individual terrorists until after 




The Smith Guidelines loosened restrictions on law enforcement and began investigating 
terrorism the same way they investigated racketeering. These guidelines lasted the longest of the 
four, from 1983 to 2001, resulting in an approximately eight times as many terrorists becoming 
active during the Smith Guidelines. At that time, the far-left had fallen out of favor as a result of 
the end of the cold war and the failure of their cellular structure. The far-right was on the 
rebound, particularly after shifting to leaderless resistance. Islamic extremists had also begun 
conducting attacks on U.S. soil while environmental terrorism was also on the rise. On average, 
individuals active during the Smith Guidelines were less educated, and gender distribution was 
similar to that of the Levi Guidelines. While being in a group was still the dominant actor type, 
there was an increase in those acting outside of a group structure.  
 The Ashcroft Guidelines were implemented after 9/11 and were in place until 2007. They 
made terrorism investigations easier for law enforcement. This shift was made in part because of 
Table 4: AG Guideline Demographics 
 % 








Ideology Far-Left  57.9 9.5 0 0 
 Far-Right 42.1 53 22.9 28.1 
 Islamic Extremism 0 21.1 37.1 68.8 
 Environmental 
 
0 16.4 40 3.1 
Education High School 33.3 40.1 31 30.8 
 College 44.4 50.8 34.5 38.5 
 Post-Graduate 
 
22.2 9.1 34.5 30.8 
Gender Male 83.3 87.1 91.7 93.9 
 Female 16.7 12.9 8.3 6.1 
      
Lone Actor Type Group 100 84.8 63.9 51.5 
 Loner 0 15.2 36.1 48.5 
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the rise of the leaderless resistance movement; the guidelines needed to be loosened to allow law 
enforcement to better investigate the threat of “lone wolf” terrorism. The majority of arrests at 
that time were environmental and Islamic extremist individuals. This is not to say that there were 
no persons arrested with a far-left ideology after the Smith Guidelines, only that none of them 
were included in this sample. Levels of education were evenly distributed among the active 
terrorists at the time. The percentage of individuals involved in groups continued to decline. The 
trend also appears in the Mukasey Guidelines.  
 The Mukasey Guidelines went into effect in 2008 and are still active at the time of this 
analysis (2018). There is an increase in the prosecution of Islamic extremists, while 
environmentalists have declined. As mentioned previously, the percentage of individuals 
involved in groups have continued to decrease. It is notable that approximately two decades 
prior, 100% of individuals were involved in a terrorist group as opposed to working alone, 
whereas, in the Mukasey Guidelines, the percentage of individuals belonging to groups dropped 
by 48.5% (Table 4). 
 
Table 5: AG Guidelines and Individual’s Longevity Distribution 






Levi 0 0 1 3.3 10 33.3 19 63.3 30 100 
Smith 70 30.2 60 25.9 47 20.3 55 23.7 232 100 
Ashcroft 9 25 13 36.1 4 11.1 10 27.8 36 100 
Mukasey 24 72.7 9 27.3 0 0 0 0 33 100 







Table 6: AG Guidelines and Individual’s Longevity 
Guidelines  Mean in Days  Median in Days 
Levi 2188.8 1660 
Smith 812.37 442 
Ashcroft 648.69 396 
Mukasey 133.79 99 
Total 851.66 473 
   
 
 Table 5 shows a bivariate examination of an individual’s longevity and which guidelines 
they began their terrorist career. There is a significant (χ2=.000) pattern showing a decline in 
longevity over time. This decline also appears in the mean differences; there was a distinct drop 
in the implementations of every new set of guidelines, which supports hypothesis one. On 
average, terrorists lasted six years if they began their careers during the Levi Guidelines. If they 
started their activity during the Smith Guidelines, their average longevity would only be about 
two years. Under the Mukasey Guidelines, terrorists have only “survived” 134 days from their 
first involvement with terrorism to the time of their arrest or demise. The overall average for an 
individual’s longevity is 851 days, and their median is 473 days.  
 The AG Guidelines and terrorists have a reactionary relationship with one another; both 
evolve when the other changes. As law enforcement learns the structures of terrorist 
organizations, the groups need to switch to a new strategy to evade law enforcement. The shift 
from rural revolutionary to cellular and then to uncoordinated violence were done in attempts to 
lessen contact with law enforcement (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009). These tactical 
changes were necessary because it had become apparent that law enforcement was the main 
reason that terrorist groups met their demise. As terrorists shifted their tactics, law enforcement 
changed their strategies to stay ahead. For example, the rise of far-left groups during the Levi 
Guidelines was one reason that the Smith Guidelines were implemented. As law enforcement is 
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given more freedom in conducting terrorist investigations, they are more likely to shorten 
terrorists’ longevity. 
Over time, the AG Guidelines have loosened restrictions against law enforcement 
investigations. This change is reflected in the average length of longevity during each guideline 
period (See Figure 1). The Levi Guidelines were the most restrictive on law enforcement and that 
period yields the highest average longevity for individuals. None of the terrorists who became 
active during the Levi Guidelines had “short” longevity, and only one had a longevity lasting 
between six and eighteen months. All other individuals lasted longer than a year and a half, with 
63% of them lasting longer than three years. This illustrates law enforcement’s reluctance in 




Once the high volume of far-left terrorist successes became apparent, President Reagan 
felt it was necessary to make a change to stop leftist groups. The Smith Guidelines were a 
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were successful. The far-left movement was decimated after their implementation. Table 4 shows 
that during the Levi Guidelines, approximately 58% of active terrorists were far-left, while 
during the Smith Guidelines the far-left only constituted 9.5%.  
Although the Smith era had the highest number of terrorists overall, it is due to the 
guidelines lasting much longer than the others. During the Smith era, only 23% (n=55) of the 
terrorist had a longevity that is characterized as very long, while 63% (n=19) lasted that long 
during the Levi Guidelines. When comparing those who lasted less than a year and a half, Smith 
had 56% (n=130) of terrorists in that category while Levi had only 3.3% (n=1). Overall, the shift 
was successful in reducing the longevity of terrorists who were active during the Levi 
Guidelines. The length of the Smith Guidelines also meant that affected the far-right movement 
when it began to rise in popularity. As a response to the guidelines, the far-right shifted to 
leaderless resistance, resulting in lone actors becoming a topic of discussion for law 
enforcement.  
 Although the implementation of the Ashcroft Guidelines came after the 9/11 attacks, they 
were also in response to the new concept of lone wolves advanced not only by the far-right, but 
also by environmentalists and Islamic extremists. Even though Al Qaeda was arguably the most 
discussed terrorist threat at the time, there was also much discussion about the government 
having no response for lone wolves. This period was the beginning of the FBI becoming a 
preventative agency instead of a reactive agency. This priority switch became even more evident 
in the Mukasey Guidelines.  
 The Mukasey Guidelines were the least restrictive on law enforcement. The high number 
of individuals with longevity lasting less than six months is a reflection of this lack of restriction. 
While the Ashcroft Guidelines claimed to make the FBI preventative, it was not until the 
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Mukasey Guidelines that it was truly practiced. This preventative strategy has led to zero 
individuals in this analysis lasting longer than a year and a half. This is a meaningful change 
compared to the Levi Guidelines when nearly all terrorists active at the time lasted longer than a 
year. The difference in guidelines has allowed for law enforcement to investigate terrorism better 
and actively eliminate the threat specific terrorists pose.  
Results II: Analysis of Characteristics 
It is difficult to demographically profile a terrorist because of the nature of the crime 
itself. Terrorism can be the result of various motivations, meaning that a wide variety of 
individuals will engage in this crime. Although individuals with similar motives may have 
comparable characteristics, it is worth analyzing them to observe any possible relationship 
between longevity and a specific characteristic.  
 
 
Table 7: Longevity Demographic Characteristics 
                           %  









Age Less than 26  33.8 24.7 15.6 26 .388 
n=218 27-36 34.3 22.9 14.3 28.6  
 More than 26 
 
29.6 26.8 26.8 16.9  
Gender Male 33.3 25.3 16.5 25.3 .074 
n=338 Female 17.1 22 29.3 31.7  
       
Education High School 43.6 19.8 16.8 19.8 .043 
n=266 College 27.8 30.2 20.6 21.4  
 Post Graduate 25.6 20.5 15.4 38.5  
       
Ideology Far-Left  22.2 16.7 38.9 22.2 .000 
n=324 Far-Right 37.1 23.8 17.2 21.9  
 Environmental 20.8 22.6 9.4 47.2  
 Islamic Extremist 34.5 34.5 15.5 15.5  




 Terrorism is a male-dominated field, leaving small opportunity for females to participate. 
Table 7 demonstrates that females may be slightly more likely (χ2=.074) to survive longer than 
males. Prior literature has shown that female involvement in a terrorist group is related to the 
movement (Corley, Smith & Damphousse, 2005; Smith, 2005). Females are very uncommon in 
the far-right and virtually non-existent in the Islamic extremist movement. The higher percentage 
of success among females may be related to the ideologies of which they associated. They were 
strongly related to the far-left, who were active during the Levi Guidelines, which was very 
beneficial to terrorist groups (Corley, Smith & Damphousse, 2005; Smith, 2005). 
 When examining an individual’s education, there is a significant relationship (χ2=.043) 
between their education and how long they can evade arrest. Table 7 illustrates that the more 
educated the terrorist, the less likely they are to get caught, which is supportive of hypothesis 
two. Nearly 44% of individuals with a high school education or less did not survive longer than 
six months. This relationship with education may also be related to the type of terrorism they 
choose to participate. Many of the environmentalist and far-leftist in this sample likely became 
environmentally and politically aware in college. As a result, there would likely be a correlation 
between ideology and education (Russell & Bowman, 1977; Corley, Smith & Damphousse, 
2005; Smith, 2005). Therefore, they are more likely to be associated with having a college 
education. While this may be true with those two groups, it would not be fair to say that far-right 
and Islamic extremists had people of significantly lower education.  
Table 8: Ideology Longevity Average 
 Average in Days Approximate Years 
Far-Left 1001.58 2.7 
Far-Right 721.87 2 
Environmental 1452.45 4 
Islamic Extremist 513.19 1.4 
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According to Table 7 which utilizes chi-square, the ideology of an individual has a 
significant relationship (χ2=.000) with how long their careers are, supporting hypothesis three. 
Table 8 shows that environmentalists survived the longest, nearly a year longer than far-left 
terrorists, against whom they are often compared. Far-right terrorists survive about two years on 
average, while Islamic extremists last about 1.4 years on average. Table 7 breaks down the 
relationship further, showing which percentage of the movement lasted how long. Nearly 50% of 
environmentalists lasted over three years, which explains their high average. Additionally, about 
60% of the Islamic extremists in this sample lasted less than one and a half years, explaining 
their low average.  
 At the height of the far-left movement, a stereotype of a terrorist began to form. People 
assumed that most terrorists were young because a majority of the individuals in the far-left were 
college-aged. Smith and Damphousse (1997) found that the average age of a terrorist is much 
older than the stereotype suggested. It was unknown whether a certain age had any effect on the 
longevity of a terrorist. Table 7 indicates that there is no relationship between age and longevity. 
It is all relatively evenly distributed except for the slight drop in individuals over twenty-six 
being active longer than three years. There is no relationship elsewhere, so this decline does not 
indicate much. This table reveals that whether terrorists start their careers in their early twenties 
or late thirties makes no difference in their ability to survive.  
Results III: Analysis of Career Activity 
Leaderless resistance has been in the spotlight since Louis Beam called for the movement 
in 1992, but even more so now that ISIS has successfully utilized similar tactics. It transcends 





Figure 2 shows how many individuals were categorized as loners and group members 
over time. Terrorist groups have been around much longer than lone wolves as a terrorist tactic. 
Group is also much larger because it is an individual measurement. There are typically multiple 
individuals associated with an incident perpetrated by a group, while there is only one person 
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Table 9: Career Activity Longevity 
                           %  












Actor Type Group  29.7 24.2 20.1 25 .196 
n=337 Loner 
 
37.5 28.1 9.4 26  
Average Prep 1-8 28.5 22.1 18.3 31.1 .018 
n=316 9+ 33.3 32.1 21 13.6  
       
Sophistication Least 26.1 19.3 6.8 47.7 .000 
n=266 Moderate 32.3 24.6 27.7 15.4  
 Most 32.9 27.7 20.2 19.1  
       
Figure 2: Number of Loners and Groups Over Time 
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terrorists involved in groups. At one point, there were more loners than there were group 
members. Considering the historical saturation of group members, the similar numbers of lone 
actors is of interest. Figure 2 shows that beginning in 2010, it appears that there has been an 
increase in the number of individuals in groups, this difference of eleven people may not be 
evident yet.  
The average longevity of an individual in a group is 2.44 years while the average 
longevity of a loner is 2.1 years. It is difficult to compare the two, because, as Figure 2 shows, 
there is a vast difference in the number of groups and loners in the dataset. The dataset has 273 
individuals in groups and 64 individuals identifying as loners. These trends are likely indicative 
of how terrorism strategies will continue. Table 9 shows how three different variables influence 
how long the terrorists last. While it is not significant, it is interesting to note that 45% of group 
members compared with only 34% of the loners fit into one of the two “long” categories, 
suggesting that there are some advantages to being a group member.  
This analysis of participatory involvement is not supportive of hypothesis four. A 
potential explanation for this is, groups can distribute preparatory tasks required to complete an 
attack, whereas loners have to participate in all the preparatory activity on their own. If all the 
extra activity is linked to one individual, it may draw more attention from law enforcement. The 
average number of acts one engages in per incident is found to have a significant relationship 
with longevity. 
When descriptive statistics were run, it appeared that once an individual committed, on 
average, nine or more preparatory acts per incident, their chances of survival decreased. This 
illustrates that the number of preparatory activities they engage in, is significantly (χ2=.018) 
related to their longevity which supports hypothesis five. Only 13.6% of individuals who 
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committed nine or more acts lasted longer than three years, while 31.1% individuals who 
committed less than nine acts lasted over three years. Nearly 2/3 of individuals who engaged in 
nine or more preparatory acts did not last longer than a year and a half. This result may also 
illustrate how law enforcement handles different threats. They may not consider an individual a 
threat if they commit only a handful of suspicious activities. Once they pass a certain threshold, 
law enforcement may have more reason to investigate them. An individual who commits only 
one or two preparatory acts may not even appear on law enforcement’s radar.  
 Both actor type and the average number of preparatory actions can be related to the 
sophistication of a plot. The more sophisticated the plot, the more preparatory activities are 
engaged in, and also the more likely they are to recruit others to help them with their plot. Table 
9 shows a significant relationship (χ2=.000) between sophistication and longevity, which 
supports hypothesis six. Nearly half of individuals who committed low sophistication attacks 
lasted over three years. In comparison with moderate and high sophistication, each with less than 
20% who lasted longer than three years. It seems as though this has become a trend in terrorism 
recently. More terrorists are utilizing more simple strategies because they are more likely to yield 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The longevity of groups and individuals are both affected by numerous factors. 
Individuals are unique because if they are in a group, they can benefit from the success of those 
around them. If the group is not succeeding, an individual has the option to pursue their goals on 
their own. This flexibility may be the reason their longevity is about a year longer than terrorist 
groups. They can survive beyond the life of their group or bypass the interworkings of a group 
altogether if they so desire. It may be difficult to determine the end of a group if not all members 
have been caught. With groups like ELF, there is no formal membership, which makes it even 
more difficult to determine where a group ends and a loner begins.  
 As hypothesis one predicted, the Attorney General Guidelines have a significant effect on 
the longevity of individuals. Alternatively, terrorists also affect the AG Guidelines. Ideally, the 
AG Guidelines would always stay ahead of terrorists, causing them to have to switch tactics; 
although time has shown that sometimes it is law enforcement who must catch up with the 
terrorists. This is shown in the implication of the Smith Guidelines, which took the place of the 
Levi Guidelines.  
The Levi Guidelines were very restrictive and allowed for terrorists to act freely. Once 
the Smith guidelines were enacted, they gave more power to law enforcement. This change in 
procedure was able to dismantle the massive threat far-left terrorists were posing to society. 
Terrorists realized they needed to change their strategy when far-right leaders, Beam, Butler, and 
Miles, were nearly imprisoned for their roles in terrorist organizations. They made the shift to 
leaderless resistance to avoid arrest. That posed a problem for law enforcement, as they were 
unable to handle the new threat. To manage it, they issued a new set of guidelines, the Ashcroft 
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Guidelines. These guidelines were then fine-tuned with the release of the Mukasey Guidelines. 
The FBI has transitioned from a reactionary agency to a preventative agency. They have more 
freedom to conduct investigations and stop attacks before they occur (Smith, 2000).  
 Because the Levi, Smith and Ashcroft guidelines have already closed, we can accurately 
measure the longevities of those guidelines. Alternatively, because the Mukasey guidelines are 
still in effect, there maybe be changes to the longevities in the future based on the cases 
collected. The time periods of these guidelines are all different; Levi and Ashcroft each lasted six 
years, Smith lasted eighteen years, and Mukasey has been in effect for ten years as of 2018. The 
variable used to categorize the AG Guidelines in Figure 1 categorizes the individual’s longevity 
based on the day they engaged in their first preparatory act, not when they were arrested. If an 
individual engaged in their first act during the first year of the Levi Guidelines, it would be 
possible for them to have a longevity of forty-one years, in theory. A terrorist engaging in their 
first preparatory act in the first year of the Mukasey Guidelines would only be able to have a 
maximum longevity of ten years. While forty-one years is improbable, this highlights that more 
recent guidelines may not provide as much of an opportunity for extended longevity. The 
average longevity will likely increase for the individuals active during the Mukasey Guidelines 
the longer they are in place.  
 Personal characteristics that may assist individuals are higher education and a higher 
number of females, while age did not seem to have a relationship with longevity. Both far-left 
and environmental individuals were known for being indoctrinated into their views during their 
higher education, and because of the nature of their beliefs, they were more likely to have a 
diverse gender group than far-right and Islamic extremist groups. Environmental may have set 
itself apart from the far-left because of the types of attacks they utilized. They were typically 
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active at night, to not hurt any living thing. They also committed attacks of low sophistication 
such as spray painting and vandalizing targets, which required minimal preparation.  
 Although it seems as though a majority of the highly educated individuals were far-left 
and environmental, there were some highly educated members of the far-right and Islamic 
extremist movement as well. In their cases, they utilized their education to become leaders, such 
as Richard Butler, Robert Miles, and Louis Beam. When Beam, Butler, and Miles implemented 
leaderless resistance, they were able to distance themselves even further from the acts required to 
fuel the movement. They used their education and intelligence to convince other members to do 
the work for the benefit of the movement. This demographic supports the expectation of 
hypothesis two.  
The analysis of gender also supports hypothesis two. It suggests that females may be 
more likely to survive longer in comparison to males. This may be a result of the movements and 
time periods in which they are active. Females were involved in the environmental movement, 
which initially was not viewed as a threat. If they began their careers at the beginning of the 
environmental movement, it is probable that they lasted until law enforcement realized the threat 
they posed. Females likely have a higher percentage of longer longevity because of the types of 
terrorism they were involved in, or the period in which they were operating. There would likely 
be a strong correlation between female longevity and ideological longevity. This correlation 
would suggest that the advantages females receive are the advantages that come with the 
ideologies they tend to follow.  
Hypothesis two was supported by the relationships of longevity with gender and 
education, but it was not supported by age. Age was not significantly related to longevity, 
suggesting that there is no benefit to engaging in terrorism as a younger or older person. This 
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finding may be unexpected because historically, younger individuals associated with the far-left 
and environmental and these movements had long average longevities. The ages of the terrorists 
in this sample were equally distributed across the longevity categories, showing no clear 
relationship. 
Ideologies go in and out of favor with different political climates. Certain demographics 
are related to specific ideologies. If ideologies fluctuate, demographics of terrorists would be 
expected to become more or less frequent during a given period. Table 4 shows the 
demographics of the individuals that were active during each guideline period. The ideologies of 
these individuals have not been consistent but have changed over time. Out of the ideologies 
examined, environmental had the longest longevity, but traits associated with it may also drive it. 
This relationship between longevity and ideology is supportive of hypothesis three, but a 
majority of the factors being examined in this study may be related to ideology. For example, the 
guidelines that the ideology was active during or the level of sophistication their incidents fall 
under. Both of these may be overlapping with ideology.  
Even though the difference in loner and group individual’s longevity was not supportive 
of hypothesis four, this may illustrate that the loners are virtually sacrificing themselves for the 
movement, allowing for higher-ups to survive longer. Groups and individuals realize that it may 
be easier to evade law enforcement if they act alone with guidance from another movement. 
There are pros and cons to both being in a group and being a loner. Individuals in a group have 
the support and knowledge of others to assist them in attacks, but they also have a higher chance 
for law enforcement contact because of the possibility of infiltration. Loners have the advantage 
of not being susceptible to infiltration, and if they do not tell anyone of their plans, they may go 
completely undetected. Typically, however, they do tell someone, which is problematic, along 
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with not having the knowledge and training that one may gain from being in a group. If groups 
continue to trend upward as Figure 4 suggests, it would be worth looking into the cause of this 
unexpected trend. It may be more likely that loners begin to trend upward and level out with the 
number of individuals in groups. 
The number of preparatory activities has a relationship with the individual’s longevity, 
supporting hypothesis five. The higher number of preparatory activities individuals engage in 
illustrates the concept that higher educated leaders ask others to do the work for them not to be 
directly involved in any acts. This shows that individuals who are committing most of the 
preparation for these attacks are less likely to last as long because they are more active. If a 
leader were to get caught, they would likely be included in the nine or less preparatory acts 
category, which shows that they would be more likely to last longer.  
Sophistication is significantly related to longevity, as hypothesis six predicted. 
Sophistication is likely related to ideology because is related to the weapons and targets terrorists 
choose. The type of target individuals goes after will dictate the kind of weapons they need to 
use. For example, environmentalists’ goal of damaging property is less likely to draw attention 
than killing civilians would. The less sophisticated the act, the longer the individual can survive. 
This finding is consistent with prior literature stating that sophistication is positively related to 
the likelihood of success of an incident (Smith, 2016). Based on this analysis the number of 
successful loners will likely continue to increase in the coming years. Once they notice that 
individuals who commit less preparatory acts last longer, they will start to pick attacks that 
require less preparation. If they begin to engage in less sophisticated acts, it is likely that their 
success will increase. This narrative has already started to come to fruition with the increased use 
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of cars to kill civilian pedestrians. It is not very sophisticated and does not require much 
preparation that would draw attention.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This research is exploratory and leads to many other questions that can be analyzed and 
improved. To start, this is a limited data set that was only gathered from the public domain. This 
constraint led to some variables being coded more than others because some information was not 
available, such as their education level. This database defines terrorism based on the FBI’s 
definition, but it may not be perfect, including every terrorist that they have charged. Also, the 
official FBI definition of terrorism has evolved. Not every individual who would be considered a 
terrorist today would have been considered a terrorist in the 1980’s. This change in definition 
may skew the consistency of the type of terrorist included in the database. While there is no 
method of correcting this, it is worth being aware of when analyzing trends. Given these 
limitations, it is expected that these trends will hold up even with the addition of currently 
lacking data. 
Another limitation is, this data only illustrates the terrorists that have been caught. The 
addition of terrorism that is unknown to law enforcement that may tell a different story. 
Individuals who have managed to evade capture would likely influence the results found in this 
study. This would be a complicated issue to overcome. To include those who were not indicted, 
researchers would have to make critical decisions on who is included, possibly leading to bias. If 
this were the case, it might be best to keep consistent definitions of what is included, but also 
maintain the knowledge of others who may not have been included.  
This project examined the difference between individual and group longevity. With this 
dataset, it appears that being in a group is beneficial for one’s longevity, but this finding was not 
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significant. It seems that there are benefits and downfalls to both being in a group and operating 
as a loner. As time continues, more loners will become active and will help explain the 
differences between the two strategies. In addition to re-examining the numbers behind loners 
and groups, it will also be necessary to update the number of terrorists active during the Mukasey 
Guidelines. Once a new set of AG Guidelines has been in place for a few years, it will be 
interesting to see how the average longevity of individuals active during the Mukasey Guidelines 
compare with guidelines before them.  
The trend among the guidelines illustrates that terrorism is declining, but this is just the 
length that a terrorist is active. Some may prefer to measure the amount of terrorism by how 
many incidents are committed. If the number of incidents committed follows the same trend of 
how long terrorists tend to last given the guidelines they are active during, this argument may be 
plausible If this were the case, it would only solidify this argument. If this were not true, it would 
open up the discussion for other possible explanations as to how terrorism is developing in the 
United States.  
Longevity is a complex phenomenon to explain. There are numerous variables that may 
influence how long a terrorist lasts. This analysis supported five out of the six hypotheses 
proposed in this project. Longevity has a significant relationship with the Attorney General 
Guidelines, gender, education, ideology, the amount of preparatory activity for an incident, and 
the sophistication of an incident. Whether the terrorist was a loner or a member of a group was 
not significant, and neither was their age. Continued research into these factors will help law 
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